The principle of timely objections remains a cornerstone of procedural law, not least in proceedings before the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal (EPRT). One of the most notable cases that illustrates this concept vividly is John Vella vs L-Awtorita’ tal-Ippjanar (App. 80/22).
John Vella brought an appeal before the Court of Appeal against a decision of the EPRT, challenging the involvement of the Għajnsielem Local Council in the proceedings leading to said decision. He argued that the council lacked a direct legal interest or the right to participate in the appeal. His contention rested on the premise that only parties with a legally recognized interest should have a role in planning disputes. On this point, however, the Court of Appeal rejected this argument, pointing to Schedule 3 of Legal Notice 552.13, stating:
“Konsulent estern ma għandu bżonn juri ebda interess, la darba hu msejjaħ biex jagħti fehma fiż-żvilupp fil-lokalità tiegħu.”
(“An external consultant does not need to show any interest once they are called to give an opinion on a development in their locality.”)
Nevertheless, while the Court’s interpretation of the law on local councils’ participation was significant (to which I equally concur), the case’s primary lesson lies in the application of the principle of acquiescence. The Court emphasized that Vella’s failure to object to the council’s involvement during the EPRT proceedings constituted tacit acceptance of their participation. The judgment states:
“La darba l-appellat ma qajjem ebda lment fuq il- locus standi u l-parteċipazzjoni attiva tal-Kunsill Lokali quddiem it-Tribunal, issa għandu ostakolu fil-fehma tal-Qorti insormontabbli…”
(“Once the appellant failed to challenge the legal standing and active involvement of the Għajnsielem Local Council during the Tribunal proceedings, he now encounters a barrier deemed insurmountable by the Court.”)
Acquiescence, as a legal doctrine, denotes the passive acceptance of a situation or the relinquishment of a right through inaction. It operates on the principle that silence or inaction, in circumstances where one is expected to assert a right, can be construed as agreement or approval. In this case, Vella’s failure to timely object to the council’s standing before the Tribunal was deemed an implicit acknowledgment of its validity. The Court’s ruling, therefore, highlights the necessity of raising objections at the earliest opportunity. This is to say that parties are expected to identify and challenge irregularities as soon as they become aware of them. Delays in raising objections not only disrupt proceedings but also undermine the principle of finality in litigation. Needless to say, this principle has particular relevance in planning law, where multiple stakeholders—some with tenuous legal interests—may attempt to influence proceedings. Here, the failure to timely challenge issues of standing or participation can result in those issues becoming effectively unassailable, as demonstrated in Vella’s case.
Importantly, I would say, the judgment also clarifies that the EPRT is not obliged to scrutinize issues of standing or participation ex officio. This places the onus squarely on the appellant. If he fails to raise an objection, the Tribunal is under no duty to independently investigate or address the matter.
The principle of acquiescence, therefore, has far-reaching implications in planning law. It underscores the need for vigilance on the part of appellant. Numerous cases have shown that participants without a clear legal right to engage in EPRT proceedings were allowed to contribute simply because no objections were raised.
