Ligi Ippjanar

In planning appeals, courts are often reminded that they are not there to substitute their views for those of the planning tribunal. The Tribunal evaluates fact, design, massing, and context. The Court only intervenes on points of law. But how do we know when a mistake is legal? A striking example lies in Malcolm Mallia […]

The interpretation of planning policy is not a matter of subjective preference or administrative convenience. It is, and must remain, a disciplined legal exercise anchored in the wording employed by the policy itself. The starting point is immutable: the written word governs. Where the policy speaks, it is to be obeyed; where it is silent, […]

In planning law, one of the most contested questions is whether an existing use—especially one that has been there “for years”—is truly vested. The term “vested right” often enters discussions where development policies seem to outlaw a particular use, but the applicant insists that the use predates the policy, and therefore no new permit should […]

One of the silent pillars of lawful decision-making is motivation. Not in the aspirational sense—but in the legal sense: the duty of public authorities to give reasons for what they decide. In planning law, this duty is not ornamental. It is a cornerstone of administrative legality, a check against arbitrariness, and a sign that justice […]

Article 80 of the Development Planning Act allows the Planning Authority to revoke or amend a permit—but only in strictly defined circumstances, such as fraud, material misstatements, or issues of public safety. Still, courts have insisted that Article 80 is not there to be pulled into indefinite suspension just because a related application is still […]

It is a settled principle in Maltese administrative law that the Court of Appeal in planning cases may only intervene “on a point of law.” This jurisdictional threshold reflects a careful constitutional balance: while the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal may evaluate facts, context, and visual integration, the Court must respect its discretion—unless that discretion […]