One of the silent pillars of lawful decision-making is motivation. Not in the aspirational sense—but in the legal sense: the duty of public authorities to give reasons for what they decide. In planning law, this duty is not ornamental. It is a cornerstone of administrative legality, a check against arbitrariness, and a sign that justice has not only been done but has been seen to be done. And yet, some decisions still collapse into vague affirmations, leaning heavily on consultees or policy designations, without showing the logical bridge from evidence to conclusion.
To place this principle in context, I like to make reference to the judgment in Dr Emmanuel George Cefai vs Planning Authority (App. 15/2021, 16 March 2022), wherein the Court of Appeal was invited to consider, inter alia, whether the planning decision under challenge had been sufficiently and properly motivated. The Tribunal had approved a change of use from store to Class 4C (food and drink establishment without cooking) in Valletta, despite objections from a resident above the property. The resident raised a raft of concerns—bad neighbourliness, impact on amenity, outdoor seating on a public stairway, and breaches of multiple policies. But when challenging the decision, he argued that the Tribunal failed to motivate its reasoning properly.
The Court was unimpressed by the vagueness of the allegation. It noted that the Tribunal need not regurgitate every point raised, but must engage substantively with the grounds of appeal:
“Kull aggravju tal-appellant gie kunsidrat mit-Tribunal fl-isfond tal-appell innifsu u l-iżvilupp mitlub. Mhux neċessarju li t-Tribunal jirreferi għal kull punt imqajjem mill-appellant biex deċiżjoni tkun motivata.”
[Each ground of appeal was considered by the Tribunal in the context of the appeal and the proposed development. It is not necessary for the Tribunal to refer to every point raised by the appellant in order for its decision to be considered reasoned.]
Still, this judgment offers room for reflection. It reminds us that motivation is not a formality. As a matter of principle, it must be sufficiently detailed to allow the affected party to understand why the decision went the way it did. A mere nod to a policy or a reference to a zoning category does not suffice if it glosses over serious, fact-based objections.
What about consultees? Here, too, a dangerous over-reliance can creep in. In this case, the Authority justified certain conclusions by pointing out that the Superintendence of Cultural Heritage had no objections. That helped. But the Tribunal also added its own evaluation—recognising that timber frontage was aesthetically preferable to a metal shutter, and that the layout of the outdoor seating respected the spatial logic of the street:
“Skont il-pjanti approvati, l-interventi fuq il-bini eżistenti huma minimi… il-faċċata tal-ħanut sejjer tkun tal-injam, li jirrifletti d-disinn u komposizzjoni ta’ faċċati tradizzjonali kummerċjali… L-imwejjed u s-siggijiet huma wkoll limitati… żgur li ma jistax jingħad li dawn sejrin jaffetwaw b’xi mod l-ispazju pedonali.”
[According to the approved plans, the interventions on the existing building are minimal… the shopfront will be made of timber, reflecting the design and composition of traditional commercial façades… The tables and chairs are also limited… and cannot be said to impair the pedestrian space in any way.]
That distinction matters. A consultee’s silence or blessing is not the end of the story. The Authority must still exercise its own judgment. Indeed, one can distinguish between cases where the consultee is considered and weighed, and those where it is rubber-stamped and substituted for reasoning. The line is crossed when a decision-maker says, in essence: “Well, the Superintendence had no objection, so we don’t need to think further.” That is not reasoning. That is abdication.
Fortunately, in this case, the Tribunal did not merely lean on the Superintendence. It noted its input, but also assessed the visual and policy compatibility of the proposal for itself:
“Is-Sovrintendenza qieset li l-iżvilupp kif propost ma hu ser iħalli ebda impatt fuq il-valur kulturali taż-żona.”
[The Superintendence considered that the proposed development would not have any impact on the cultural value of the area.]
But the Tribunal didn’t stop there—it independently concluded that the design was aesthetically beneficial and policy-compliant. That, legally, is the right approach.
In short: consultees in planning law inform decisions, but they cannot replace them.
