It is submitted that Policy 6.2C of the Rural Policy and Design Guidance 2014 is one of the clearest examples in Maltese planning law of a tightly-framed, exception-based regime. It allows redevelopment and change of use of existing buildings outside development zone only where the applicant meets a series of cumulative thresholds. The policy is not a regularisation shortcut; it is a narrow corridor, and the burden of walking down that corridor rests entirely on the applicant.
The first and most basic threshold is contained in Criterion 1, which provides that permission may be granted for redevelopment only if “the applicant can sufficiently prove that the building is covered by development permission … or that it is/was a pre-1978 building.” The choice of words is important. The onus is on the applicant (“can sufficiently prove”), and proof must relate either to a clear development permission for the actual structure in issue, or to aerial evidence that the same structure existed before the 1978 cut-off. Reliance on later aerial imagery, or on permissions whose true scope (for example, extensions to a small rural structure) does not match the larger footprint now on site, is not enough. Where the official aerial sequence shows only a small building in 1978 and 1988, and a much larger mass later, only the pre-existing part can even begin to qualify. Anything built afterwards, even if physically attached, remains outside the shelter of Criterion 1.
Closely linked to this is the treatment of “use” under Criterion 5. Policy 6.2C explicitly limits the use of the replacement building. Criterion 5(a) restricts redevelopment to “a use already legally established and/or covered by a development permission”, while Criterion 5(c) permits the conversion of “disused livestock farms which have ceased operation for at least 10 years … and which are creating a negative environmental impact” into one dwelling not exceeding a specified floor-space. Two key principles emerge.
First, a rural building does not become a dwelling in law merely because someone wishes to live there, or because it has a roof and four walls. For the purposes of 5(a), what matters is whether residential use is already “legally established”, i.e. supported by a clear permission or by long-standing, uncontested residential use where policy so allows. If the historic function of the fabric has been agricultural (e.g. farm rooms, stores, stables), conversion to residential use is not legitimised by the mere assertion of comfort or family need. Policy 6.2C is structured precisely to avoid the creeping conversion of every rural structure into a dwelling.
Secondly, Criterion 5(c) is framed in relation to livestock farms as such. It speaks of “disused livestock farms” in the plural, and of redeveloping “these” into a single dwelling. The evident intention is to address the planning and environmental challenge of large, obsolete farm complexes that have been abandoned for a significant period and are now causing negative impacts. It is not a carte blanche to take whichever fragment of a farm is convenient, re-label it as “disused”, and convert that small portion into a dwelling while the rest of the agricultural complex continues to operate or remains in place. The farm must be understood as a whole: there must be credible proof that the livestock operation as a unit has ceased for at least ten years, that it is no longer required, and that its physical presence is an environmental liability rather than a resource. Vague registration documents showing that “a farm existed in the general area” are not, without more, sufficient.
The evidential standard applied in practice mirrors this structure. Documentary material from veterinary or agricultural registries may show that a farm was registered under a certain name at a certain address, but unless that can be convincingly tied to the specific surveyed site, the policy threshold remains unmet. Equally, when the gross floor area of a farm complex is substantially larger than the portion proposed for conversion, attempts to treat only a single room or small block (say, a handful of square metres out of hundreds) as the “disused farm” envisaged by Criterion 5(c) sit uneasily with the text. Policy 6.2C assumes a serious, whole-farm intervention, not piecemeal residential colonisation.
Criterion 4 adds a further substantive filter: any replacement building must be “of a high quality rural design and shall fully respect the wider context in which it is located.” This requirement dovetails with the SPED’s Thematic Objective 1 and Rural Objective 3, which seek to limit rural land to uses that are necessary or legitimate, and to safeguard rural landscapes from avoidable visual degradation. It is not enough that a proposal can be drawn neatly on a plan; the design must visibly improve, or at least not worsen, the rural scene. Bulky, visually harsh structures, or accumulations of additions that jar with the surrounding pattern of fields and traditional buildings, will not satisfy this test simply because they happen to sit where some form of structure existed at one time. High quality rural design and contextual respect are independent hurdles.
All of this must be examined through the lens of Article 72(2) of the Development Planning Act. That provision requires the decision-maker to “have regard to” plans, policies and regulations, and only then to “any other material consideration, including legal commitments in the vicinity, environmental, aesthetic and sanitary considerations,” together with representations from the public and from boards, committees and consultants. Courts have long argued that the sequence here is revealing: the law, plans and policies are primary; other considerations are secondary and may not be used to dilute them. Jurisprudence has underlined that no “commitment” can justify the grant of a permit that is contrary to the applicable policy framework.
Three general lessons follow for rural redevelopment and sanctioning ODZ structures.
First, proof of status is foundational, not decorative. Where a policy like 6.2C is framed in terms of “the applicant can sufficiently prove”, assertions and impressions are not enough. Aerial imagery at the correct cut-off dates must actually show the building in the form now being relied upon. Permissions must be read carefully to understand what was in fact authorised (e.g. an agricultural extension rather than a dwelling). Registry documents must be tightly linked to the specific site and use claimed. On a balance of probabilities, if the structure on the ground is significantly more extensive than what can be traced back to 1978 or to a precise permission, that “extra” fabric cannot be smuggled under the policy umbrella.
Secondly, new dwellings in the rural area remain the exception. Outside development zone, the default position under the SPED and RPDG is that new residential units are not to be created unless they fall within narrowly defined categories (e.g. dwellings under other specific policies, or true conversions of whole, disused livestock farms meeting strict criteria). Attempts to re-characterise agricultural rooms as long-standing homes, or to treat fragments of farm complexes as standalone farms eligible for conversion, run against the grain of the policy. The combined effect of Criterion 1, Criterion 5 and the SPED’s thematic and rural objectives is to keep residential creep in check.
Thirdly, Article 72(2) does not oblige the authority to stretch policy to fit the facts. Where an applicant complains that an authority “misapplied” the law or failed to consider SPED objectives favouring consolidation of development, it is essential to distinguish between urban consolidation policies (which seek to focus growth in existing built-up areas) and rural protection policies (which seek to prevent the further urbanisation of ODZ). Article 72(2) instructs the decision-maker to consider both sets of objectives, but always within the overall framework of plans and policies that apply to the specific site. In a genuinely rural context, the SPED’s rural objectives and the RPDG controls are the governing texts; urban consolidation cannot be invoked to justify a new ODZ dwelling.
Finally, it is submitted that a wider procedural principle is also at work. In a regime built on cumulative, tightly drafted criteria, it is not enough for an applicant simply to assert compliance in general terms (“the proposal satisfies all criteria” or “is in line with RPDG”). Good administration requires that the applicant specify which criterion is said to be satisfied, and how. Equally, where specialist bodies (for example, agricultural or veterinary authorities) are asked to confirm past uses and decline to do so with the necessary precision, the evidential gap remains with the applicant. Policy 6.2C does not shift the burden onto consultees; it keeps it firmly on the shoulders of those who seek to redevelop or regularise ODZ buildings.
Seen in this light, Policy 6.2C, SPED and Article 72(2) form a coherent system: redevelopment and change of use ODZ are possible, but only where legal establishment, genuine rural use, disuse and design quality are convincingly demonstrated, and where the rural landscape emerges no worse — and ideally somewhat better — than before.
