According to the current Development Planning Act, Article 94 is divided into two sub-articles.

Sub-article (1) provides that, notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, for the purposes of carrying out their functions under the Act, the Executive Council and such officer, employee, committee, or any other person as may be authorised by the Executive Council or the Executive Chairperson for this purpose, and if so required with the assistance of the Police Force, shall have: (a) the right to enter any premises, public or private, at all reasonable times, and in the case of a dwelling house after giving previous reasonable notice of at least twenty-four hours and not before seven o’clock in the morning or later than seven o’clock in the evening, to inspect or survey any land, verify whether an illegal development or activity is taking or has taken place, take photographs after entry, or request any legitimate information from any occupier of such premises; and (b) the right to do anything that is ancillary or consequential thereto. Sub-article (2) requires that any person authorised under sub-article (1) shall produce a means of identification issued by the Authority and thereupon be authorised to enter the land.

Bill No. 143 of 2025 amends Article 94 in two respects. First, in the English text only, the notice period before entering a dwelling house in paragraph (a) is extended from “twenty-four” to “forty-eight (48)” hours. This is not a novel safeguard but a harmonisation measure intended to align the English version with the Maltese text, which has always prescribed forty-eight hours’ notice (Cap. 552, art. 94(1)(a) [Maltese version]). Secondly, paragraph (b) is replaced to expand the scope of ancillary powers: the revised wording authorises “the use of various methods and technologies for the surveillance, monitoring, and detection of development activities” and “the authority to store and maintain data derived from such activities in any format whatsoever.”

The insertion of this explicit language provides a clear statutory basis for employing modern enforcement tools such as drones, satellite imagery, GIS mapping, time-lapse cameras, and remote sensors, as well as for archiving data digitally, including in cloud-based repositories. Under the previous formulation, such activities might have been defensible as “ancillary” to entry, but their absence from the statute made them more vulnerable to ultra vires challenge. The constitutional legitimacy of this power is supported by Article 37(2)(a)(i) of the Constitution of Malta, which protects the privacy of the home but permits its restriction “in the interests of… town and country planning,” and by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which requires that interferences be lawful, pursue a legitimate aim, and be necessary in a democratic society.

The litigation in George Scerri et vs MEPA et (Rik. Kost. 45/09, Qorti Ċivili Prim’ Awla (Kost.), 1 February 2011) is particularly instructive. In that case, MEPA officials, accompanied by police, entered the Scerris’ dwelling in Mtarfa to conduct a survey in connection with a Planning Control application, notwithstanding that the owners had already appealed to the Planning Appeals Board. The Court recorded that “minkejja li r-rikorrenti kienu diġà jiem qabel ma seħħ il-każ ressqu appell… l-Awtorità intimata… xorta waħda dehrilha li kellha żżomm l-aċċess fuq l-art tar-rikorrenti” [even though the applicants had, days before the incident, lodged an appeal… the Authority nonetheless considered that it should maintain access to the applicants’ property]. Having reviewed the evidence, the Court found no violation of the applicants’ fundamental rights. The inspection was carried out under express statutory authority, with police present to maintain order, and did not amount to a disproportionate or abusive intrusion. In the Court’s assessment, nothing in the officials’ conduct fell outside the lawful scope of the enforcement power, and the fact that appeal proceedings were pending did not deprive the Authority of its right of access in these circumstances. Later interlocutory measures in the same case (25 October 2018) confirmed that the Court would only restrain enforcement action where there was a genuine risk of undermining the effectiveness of a constitutional judgment. In the absence of such risk, the lawful exercise of entry powers, properly grounded in statute, was upheld.

This jurisprudence reinforces the principle that robust planning enforcement, when proportionately exercised under clear statutory authority, will be sustained by the Maltese courts even in the face of constitutional challenge.

Seen against this backdrop, the amendments to Article 94 in Bill No. 143 amount to a legislative codification of existing enforcement practice rather than an expansion of principle. The forty-eight-hour notice provision merely ensures consistency between the English and Maltese texts, while the explicit reference to technological surveillance formalises methods already available to the Authority. From a data protection perspective, the amendment satisfies the “lawfulness” requirement under Article 6(1)(c) of the General Data Protection Regulation for processing personal data obtained through surveillance, though the GDPR principles of purpose limitation, data minimisation, and storage limitation (Arts. 5(1)(b)–(e)) remain applicable.

The proposed amendment also aligns with best international practice by recognising that modern planning enforcement increasingly depends on real-time and geospatial technologies such as drones, satellite imaging, GIS, and automated surveillance cameras. The express statutory inclusion of such methods enhances the “quality of law” required by the European Court of Human Rights under Article 8 of the ECHR, which demands that any interference with private life and the home be lawful, necessary in a democratic society, and proportionate to the aim pursued. As the ECtHR held in Uzun v. Germany (App. No. 35623/05, 2010), GPS surveillance by public authorities may be permissible when strictly regulated, serves a legitimate objective, and is conducted under an adequate legal framework. A key factor in that case was the foreseeability of the state’s power to conduct surveillance, something this amendment seeks to guarantee through precise statutory language.

Moreover, the ECtHR in Amann v. Switzerland (2000) and Rotaru v. Romania (2000) emphasised that the collection and retention of personal data must not only serve a legitimate aim but also be governed by rules offering sufficient guarantees against arbitrary interference. Thus, the revised paragraph (b) provides an essential statutory anchor for the use of enforcement technologies, mitigating the risk of ultra vires challenges under the ECHR framework. The legislative text now plainly satisfies the Court’s requirement that surveillance activities be foreseeable and accessible to those affected, while remaining subject to safeguards and oversight mechanisms.

In parallel, the data protection implications of this power must be assessed under Regulation (EU) 2016/679, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Article 6(1)(c) permits processing when it is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject. The statutory recognition of data collection and storage in Article 94 satisfies this condition. Further, Article 5(1) of the GDPR mandates that personal data be processed in accordance with principles of purpose limitation, data minimisation, and storage limitation. Surveillance data gathered through authorised entry or remote monitoring must therefore be subject to strict access controls and retention policies. As argued by Mitsilegas et al., public authorities collecting surveillance data must ensure the lawful basis is narrowly construed, and that data retention is tied to enforcement need—not institutional convenience (Mitsilegas et al., 2021).

Importantly, this amendment also addresses one of the structural concerns repeatedly flagged in ECtHR jurisprudence: the “chilling effect” of unregulated surveillance. By specifying not only that technological methods may be used, but also that data may be stored “in any format whatsoever,” the amendment limits ambiguity and thereby strengthens the democratic legitimacy of enforcement practice. The ECtHR in Weber and Saravia v. Germany (2006) accepted that strategic monitoring could be lawful provided it is “based on clear and detailed rules,” including limits on duration, use, and independent supervision. Bill No. 143 conforms with that guidance by embedding a transparent legal basis within primary legislation.

While critics may argue that increased surveillance power—especially when paired with data retention—risks overreach, the proportionality of enforcement remains the guiding test under both the ECHR and GDPR regimes. This is echoed in Van der Sloot’s analysis of ECtHR privacy doctrine, which explains how the Court increasingly performs a constitutional-style proportionality assessment, balancing the need for administrative effectiveness with the fundamental right to privacy (Van der Sloot, 2020).

In sum, the amendments to Article 94 do not represent a fundamental shift in enforcement philosophy but rather a codification of existing practice made necessary by legal and technological evolution. They support a dual imperative: ensuring that citizens are notified in a procedurally fair manner and that the State has access to the tools necessary to uphold planning law in an efficient and rights-compliant way. The reforms bring Maltese law into line with European and international standards on lawful surveillance, proportional enforcement, and regulated data handling, while preserving judicial oversight and constitutional guarantees.

After all, Scerri has already demonstrated that, in Maltese constitutional practice, courts will uphold the exercise of such powers where they are explicitly authorised, proportionately applied, and free from arbitrariness.

  •  European Court of Human Rights, Uzun v. Germany, App. No. 35623/05, Judgment of 2 September 2010.
  • European Court of Human Rights, Amann v. Switzerland, App. No. 27798/95, Judgment of 16 February 2000.
  • European Court of Human Rights, Rotaru v. Romania, App. No. 28341/95, Judgment of 4 May 2000.
  • European Court of Human Rights, Weber and Saravia v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00, Decision of 29 June 2006.
  • V. Mitsilegas, E. Guild, S. Carrera, G. Gonzalez Fuster, Access to Electronic Data by Third Country Law Enforcement Authorities, Queen Mary University of London, 2021.
  • B. Van der Sloot, The Quality of Law: How the European Court of Human Rights Gradually Became a European Constitutional Court for Privacy Cases, JIPITEC, 2020.
  • Regulation (EU) 2016/679, General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).