Bill No. 143 of 2025 proposes a notable redrafting of Article 70 of the Development Planning Act, reshaping the core definition of “development” without altering its underlying structure of general definition plus specific exemptions. The reform lies in the better wording, the addition of two new exemptions, and the absorption of content from sub-articles (3) and (4) directly into the main definition.

Under the existing law, Article 70(2) reads:

“ ‘development’ means the carrying out of building, engineering, quarrying, mining or other operations for the construction, demolition or alterations in, on, over, or under any land or the sea, the placing of advertisements or the making of any material change in use of land or building and sea, other than:
(a) maintenance operations which affect only the interior of a building or which do not materially affect the external appearance of the building:
Provided that such maintenance works are not contrary to any order made under this Act in relation to the building:
Provided further that maintenance operations shall not include demolition and rebuilding works, irrespective of the location where such demolition and rebuilding works are carried out;
(b) the use of land for agriculture, animal husbandry and forestry (including afforestation), except where such use consists of:
(i) the erection of buildings or amounts to intensive raising of crops or animals; or
(ii) the reclamation of land for agriculture by the deposit of material on such land unless such reclamation of land for agriculture can be proven to have subsisted prior to 1994;
(c) in the case of buildings or other land that are used for a purpose of any class specified in an order made by the Minister, as the case may be, under this Act, the use thereof for any other purpose of the same class;
(d) emergency works in relation to public safety carried out by Government;
(e) a use which subsisted continuously from a period when such use was not considered illegal and did not require a permit;
(f) the placing of plant and machinery required for the operation of a use already covered by development permission on land within the perimeter of the site covered by the same permission of the use being operated.”

Following this, the current Article 70(3) and (4) set out what have been called the “circular provisions”, repeating and clarifying elements already implicit in the definition:

“(3) For the purpose of this article –
(a) the use of a building resulting in an increase in the number of dwelling units in which the building was previously used; or
(b) the deposit of materials on land; or
(c) the use for the display of advertisements on any external part of a building that is not normally used for that purpose,
involves a material change in the use of that building or land, or part thereof, without prejudice, in the case of advertisements, to any regulations or order made under this Act with respect to their control.

(4) For the purpose of this article, development includes clearing of valleys from accumulated sediment and development in relation to the sea includes land reclamation from the sea, aquaculture and beach developments and their related uses.”

Bill No. 143 replaces all of this with a single, integrated clause:

“ ‘development’ means the carrying out of building, engineering, quarrying, mining, or other operations for the construction, demolition, or alteration of any structure in, on, over, or under any land or the sea; the making of any material change in the use of land or buildings; the use of a building in a manner that results in an increase in the number of dwelling units over and above its previous use; the deposit of materials on land; the clearing of valleys from accumulated sediment; and, in relation to the sea, includes land reclamation, aquaculture, beach developments, and any related uses and the placing or display of advertisements;
(a) … (f) [as before];
(g) the placement of any object or structure which may be dismantled without substantial demolition or breakage, and is not visible from any road;
(h) the deposit of inert materials on land, including in exhausted or disused quarries, where the land is being returned to its original condition, levels, and contours.”

Bill No. 143 of 2025 introduces a significant textual revision to Article 70 of the Development Planning Act (Cap. 552), which defines “development” for the purposes of Maltese planning law. The proposal does not alter the essential structure of the current provision, which consists of a broad general definition followed by specific exemptions, but it does consolidate dispersed interpretative clauses into the principal definition, removes redundant repetition, and adds two new exemptions of practical relevance. The existing arrangement requires the reader to navigate between sub-articles (2), (3) and (4) to piece together the full meaning of “development,” with the main definition in sub-article (2) supplemented by so-called “circular provisions” that repeat or clarify what is already implicit. These provisions cover matters such as the increase in the number of dwelling units in a building, the deposit of materials on land, the display of advertisements on parts of a building not normally used for that purpose, the clearing of valleys from accumulated sediment, and, in relation to the sea, activities such as land reclamation, aquaculture, and beach developments. Although interpretatively useful, their separation from the main clause has resulted in a fragmented and less accessible legislative text.

The Bill recasts this into a single, integrated clause in which all inclusions appear within the opening definition itself. The increase in dwelling units, the deposit of materials, the clearing of valleys, marine-related activities, and the placing or display of advertisements are all brought into the same definitional frame alongside the core categories of construction, demolition, alteration, and other operations. The six long-standing exemptions—covering matters such as interior maintenance, certain agricultural uses, same-class use changes, emergency works by government, established lawful uses, and the placement of plant and machinery within existing permitted sites—are retained in substance, but to these are added two new carve-outs. Paragraph (g) exempts the placement of any object or structure which may be dismantled without substantial demolition or breakage and is not visible from any road, thus expressly recognising reversibility as a statutory criterion. Paragraph (h) exempts the deposit of inert materials on land, including in exhausted or disused quarries, where the purpose is to restore the land to its original condition, levels, and contours.

The practical significance of this restructuring is considerable. Under the existing formulation, assessing whether an activity constitutes development requires sequential reading across multiple sub-articles and cross-referencing between inclusions and exemptions, an arrangement that can obscure the threshold question and encourage interpretative error. By integrating all relevant activities into the principal definition, the Bill enables an immediate determination of whether a given act—be it building alteration, valley clearance, land reclamation, or material deposit—falls within the statutory concept of “development” and whether any specific exclusion applies. The elimination of the “circular” provisions as stand-alone clauses removes duplication, producing a text that is both more coherent and more efficient in its application. Moreover, the addition of the two targeted exemptions responds to recurring practical situations: the distinction between permanent structures and reversible, concealed objects, and the environmental and planning benefit of quarry rehabilitation or other land restoration that does not create new forms of development.

The codification of exemption (g) is particularly notable when viewed against the comparative backdrop of UK planning law, where the question of whether reversible or temporary structures amount to “development” has largely been addressed through piecemeal case law. Decisions such as Buxton v Cambridge City Council [2021] EWHC 2028 (Admin), which treated the capacity for dismantling without harm as a relevant consideration even in the absence of any actual plan for removal, Skerritts of Nottingham Ltd v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport & Regions [2000] EWCA Civ 5569, where a seasonal marquee was classified as a building due to its size, permanence and physical attachment, and R (Wilsdon) v First Secretary of State [2006] EWHC 2980 (Admin), which held that a temporary need did not preclude a structure from requiring permission if its physical characteristics were permanent, demonstrate the fact-specific and often uncertain nature of the UK approach.

Malta, by contrast, will through Bill No. 143 provide a clear statutory rule: only structures that can be dismantled without substantial demolition or breakage and which are entirely concealed from view from any “road” (as broadly defined in Cap. 552 to include public and private thoroughfares, lanes, alleys, quays and footpaths) will be excluded from the concept of development.

This exemption operates through two cumulative tests, both of which must be satisfied: dismantlability without substantial demolition or breakage, and invisibility from any road. The first requires that the structure be physically removable without major damage to its materials, be attached in a way that permits disassembly, and remain capable of reuse in substantially the same form elsewhere, reflecting the principle of reversibility recognised in UK jurisprudence. The second requires a complete absence of visibility from any defined road, taking into account direct lines of sight, permanent screening, and all possible vantage points; even a glimpse from a private alley defeats the exemption. Only where both criteria are met does the activity fall outside the statutory definition. This is illustrated by examples: a prefabricated shed bolted to the ground and entirely concealed behind another building would qualify, whereas a removable cabin visible from a private lane would not, and a cemented timber structure hidden from the street would fail the dismantlability requirement.

By bringing all definitional elements into one coherent statement and legislating for situations that elsewhere remain subject to interpretative discretion, Bill No. 143 strengthens both the accessibility and the certainty of Maltese planning law. It clarifies the boundary between regulated and exempt activities, reduces unnecessary administrative intervention, and addresses long-standing drafting inefficiencies without altering the fundamental breadth of the term “development.”

Let us give some practical context to what this new exemption really means, so that decision-makers, enforcement officers, and even applicants can approach it with a clear understanding of how it works in practice. The law does not create a loose or casual opt-out from the definition of “development.” Instead, it sets a deliberately high, two-stage threshold, and both conditions must be met before an activity can be excluded. If either fails, the structure is still development and still requires a permit.

The first condition—dismantlability without substantial demolition or breakage—goes beyond convenience. It asks whether the object or structure can be removed in its entirety without destroying it or causing major damage to its materials, and whether it can be reused in substantially the same form elsewhere. This is not about whether it could theoretically be moved if one were willing to break it up; it is about physical reversibility, a concept echoed in Buxton v Cambridge City Council mentioned earlier, where the court held that the ability to restore the original state without loss of integrity was enough to tip the balance in favour of approval. In Maltese practice, this might mean a modular kiosk bolted to a concrete pad, removable in sections, passing the test, whereas a small block-built storeroom—no matter how modest—would fail because dismantling it would inevitably involve smashing the blocks to rubble. Inspectors will pay close attention to the method of fixing: bolts and screws may suggest dismantlability; cemented foundations or welded frames almost certainly do not.

The second condition—complete invisibility from any “road”—is equally uncompromising. Ads we have see, Chapter 552 defines “road” with striking breadth: it includes not just public streets but also private lanes, alleys, quays, footways, passages, bridges, and even spaces that are not thoroughfares at all. This means that concealment is not achieved by hiding a structure from the main road alone; it must be hidden from every possible point that qualifies as a road under the Act. A shed that cannot be seen from the street but is visible from a private footpath or from over a wall along a quay will fail. Enforcement officers will not limit their checks to the obvious vantage points but will test visibility from every angle, and they will take a worst-case approach: seasonal foliage or temporary barriers do not count as permanent screening. A structure hidden by summer greenery but visible in winter, once the leaves have fallen, will be treated as visible all year round.

This means that, in application, the exemption works as a sequential test. First, dismantlability is examined. If a structure cannot be removed intact without substantial breakage, the inquiry ends there—it is development, regardless of whether it is hidden. If it passes dismantlability, visibility is then tested. If the structure can be seen from any road, the exemption fails, no matter how perfectly reversible it may be. The order is deliberate: it prevents an applicant from arguing that concealment should excuse a fundamentally permanent fixture.

This structure of the law produces predictable outcomes in practice. A prefabricated shed on a rural plot, bolted to the ground and tucked entirely behind an existing barn, invisible from all public and private ways, would pass both tests and therefore not count as development. A removable cabin parked on a plot but visible from a neighbouring private driveway would fail because the driveway is a “road” in law. A timber hut hidden from every road but fixed into cement foundations would fail at the first hurdle because dismantling it would mean destroying its structure.

Exemption (g) is, therefore, not a loophole; it is a narrow and carefully drawn provision designed to keep genuinely temporary and concealed installations outside the permit system while ensuring that anything with lasting physical or visual impact remains within regulatory control.

Decision-makers can apply it confidently by asking two simple but stringent questions—can it be dismantled intact, and is it entirely invisible from any road?—and remembering that if the answer to either is “no,” the exemption does not apply.

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Buxton v Cambridge City Council [2021] EWHC 2028 (Admin), High Court (Queen’s Bench Division – Administrative Court).

Skerritts of Nottingham Ltd v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport & Regions & Anor [2000] EWCA Civ 5569, Court of Appeal.

(on the application of Wilsdon) v First Secretary of State [2006] EWHC 2980 (Admin), Queen’s Bench Division.