One of the quieter yet potentially far-reaching amendments introduced by Bill No. 143 concerns Article 56 of the Development Planning Act. This provision regulates discontinuance orders—a rarely invoked yet potent planning mechanism enabling the Executive Council to mandate the cessation of a lawful land use or the removal of buildings or works erected under valid permission. Though the statutory power appears drastic, its practical use has historically been negligible. Meanwhile, the proposed revision has received scant public attention, perhaps owing to its technical language and the perception of limited practical significance. Yet its implications for landowners, planners, and administrative law are by no means trivial.

As presently framed, Article 56(1) provides:

“(1) The  Executive  Council  may,  having  regard  to  the provisions of this Act, regulations, plans, policies and to other material considerations, by order served on the owner or occupier of any land, require any existing use or activity or any works to be discontinued or any building, plant, equipment or other thing whatsoever to be removed from any land, or requiring both such discontinuance and removal.

(2) Where a discontinuance order or removal order is made in respect of an activity, works or use, or in respect of a building, plant, equipment or other thing lawfully carried out or lawfully existing on the land mentioned in the order, the Authority shall be liable to pay compensation for any losses sustained as a result of the order:

Provided  that  any  benefits  derived  from  the  same discontinuance order or removal order shall be offset against the losses aforesaid:

Provided further that no such compensation is due if the permission itself allows the Authority to request the discontinuance of any existing use or activity or any works to be discontinued or any building, plant, equipment or other thing whatsoever to be removed from any land.”

This provision is tempered by two qualifications: compensation may be reduced where offsetting benefits accrue from the discontinuance, and none is payable where the original permission explicitly provided for such revocation. The existing formulation thus reflects a balanced approach, acknowledging that losses stemming from public planning decisions may merit financial redress, but not unqualified compensation.

Despite superficial similarities with revocation, Article 56 operates within a distinct legal context from Article 80 (to be renumbered Article 80A), which permits revocation of planning permissions in the interest of public safety. Article 80 is reactive and exceptional—triggered by imminent risk. By contrast, Article 56 is a forward-looking policy instrument, allowing the state to realign lawful uses with emerging spatial strategies or planning priorities. Its object is not danger but divergence. In this sense, Article 56 functions as an active regulatory tool within the broader framework of spatial governance.

Bill No. 143 proposes a marked narrowing of this entitlement by emending sub-article 2 of Article 56. The revised text states:

“(2) Where a discontinuance order or removal order is made in respect of any activity, works, or use, or in respect of any building, plant, equipment, or other structure or object lawfully carried out or anything else lawfully existing on the land specified in the order, the Authority shall be liable to pay compensation solely for the direct costs and expenses reasonably incurred in relation to such activity, works, or use:

Provided that no compensation shall be payable in respect of any loss relating to the value of the land itself, including any diminution in land value arising from the making of the order:

Provided further that any benefits derived from the same discontinuance order or removal order shall be offset against the losses aforesaid:

Provided further that no such compensation is due if the permission itself allows the Authority to request the discontinuance of any existing use or activity or any works to be discontinued or any building, plant, equipment or other thing whatsoever to be removed from any land.”

Clearly, the effect with the amended text is to exclude compensation for indirect losses, speculative gains, or reductions in market value. That is to say only actual, demonstrable, and reasonable direct costs may be recovered. The Authority’s financial exposure is thereby significantly reduced, while the financial security of landowners is correspondingly curtailed.

In a way, the proposed limitation on compensation aligns with a widely accepted principle in comparative planning law: development permissions are inherently provisional.  As Rachelle Alterman explains in Takings International: A Comparative Perspective on Land Use Regulations and Compensation Rights:

“Planning permissions are understood as revocable and conditional, not a promise of permanence” (Alterman 2010, pp. 27–28).

Her comparative study of thirteen developed jurisdictions reveals that most treat such permissions as policy instruments subject to recalibration, rather than as vested property rights. In a similar vein, Christopher Serkin, writing in Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulation, observes that governments frequently aim “to eliminate existing uses without paying compensation,” provided the law permits it (Serkin 2009, pp. 1230–1240). 

Yet this is only one side of the scholarly conversation.

A significant body of academic literature—particularly in U.S. planning and land use law—argues that development permits may indeed constitute vested rights. For example, W.F. Witt Jr. explains that vested rights accrue when landowners act in reliance on a valid permit.

In other words, where owners have lawfully invested in land or buildings, a reasonable expectation of regulatory stability arises. 

Similarly, E.K. MacColl Jr. asserts that a permit combined with substantial expenditures often satisfies legal standards for vested rights.

David L. Callies maintains that rights to complete development survive regulatory change if reliance and legal thresholds are met. Likewise, J.J. Delaney and W. Kominers emphasize that vested rights can exist before construction, provided legal reliance and procedural validity are demonstrated.

Further, T.G. Pelham et al. document courts finding vested rights in land use approvals beyond just final building permits, highlighting the legal protection of development expectations. And T.E. DePalma argues that “a final building permit is the sine qua non of a vested right to develop”.

Incidentally, the same Bill 143 later on proposes this as an addition to Article 72:

“(2a) Any of the following shall constitute a vested right which shall not be extinguished by Article 72(2):
(a) a valid development permission which has been lawfully implemented…”

Therefore, we can see a clear tension here. 

Importantly,  however, the proposed amendments to Article 56 do not (and cannot) confer immunity upon the Planning Authority in tort. The Authority remains accountable under the general rules of civil responsibility where it acts ultra vires or executes its statutory duties negligently.  One shall not forget Albert Satariano et vs Awtorità tal-Ippjanar (1721/2001), a 2010 judgment of the Civil Court (First Hall), in which the Authority was held liable for demolishing structures not subject to an enforcement notice. The Court observed:

“Lanqas kien hemm bżonn l-Artikolu 469A tal-Kap. 12 biex irendi l-Awtorità responsabbli, għaliex hija ma għandha ebda immunità mill-artikoli tal-Kodiċi Ċivili li jirrigwardjaw ir-responsabbiltà għad-danni ta’ min jaġixxi oltre d-drittijiet tiegħu.”

In other words, the Planning Authority enjoys no immunity from civil liability when it exceeds its legal powers. This ruling had made it clear that even lawfully initiated planning decisions must be executed with legality, proportionality, and procedural fairness. Put simpler, administrative discretion does not override the foundational principles of legal responsibility.

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Alterman, Rachelle. Takings International: A Comparative Perspective on Land Use Regulations and Compensation Rights. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2010.

Callies, David L. “Land Use: Herein of Vested Rights, Plans, and the Relationship of Planning and Controls.” University of Hawai’i Law Review, vol. 2, 1979, pp. 167–192. 

DePalma, Thomas E. “Developers’ Vested Rights.” Western New England Law Review, vol. 23, 1982, pp. 355–386. 

Delaney, John J., and William Kominers. “He Who Rests Less, Vests Best: Acquisition of Vested Rights in Land Development.” Saint Louis University Law Journal, vol. 23, 1979, pp. 452–472. 

Held, Mateja. Legitimate Expectations in Spatial Planning and Building. 2025. 

MacColl Jr., Edward K. “Vested Rights and Land Use Development.” Oregon Law Review, vol. 54, 1975, pp. 235–260. 

Pelham, Thomas G., Amy U. Lindgren, and Laura D. Weil. “What Do You Mean I Can’t Build!?” Journal of Land Use & Environmental Law, vol. 14, no. 2, 1999, pp. 235–258. 

Serkin, Christopher. “Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulation.” New York University Law Review, vol. 84, no. 4, 2009, pp. 1222–1292.

Witt Jr., W.F. “Vested Rights in Land Uses—A View from the Practitioner’s Perspective.” Urban Lawyer, vol. 18, no. 3, 1986, pp. 409–422.