The recent Court of Appeal judgment in Godwin Gatt u Amanda Gatt v Awtorità tal-Ippjanar (App. Ċiv. 946/2021/1, 20 October 2025) re-affirms the rule-of-law settlement that separates administration, merits tribunals, and courts. The Court states the allocation crisply: “M’hemm l-ebda dubju li deċiżjonijiet dwar ippjanar huma fdati f’idejn l-Awtorità tal-Ippjanar bid-dritt ta’ appell quddiem it-Tribunal… u bid-dritt ta’ appell quddiem il-Qorti tal-Appell (Kompetenza Inferjuri).”
[There is no doubt that planning decisions are entrusted to the Planning Authority with a right of appeal to the Tribunal… and a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction).]
The corollary follows: “Huwa stabbilit li l-Qrati ta’ kompetenza ċivili m’għandhomx ġurisdizzjoni” [it is established that the civil courts have no jurisdiction] to inquire into planning-administrative controversies reserved by statute to specialist fora and the appellate court they feed into.
On its facts, the case involved rural property at Għajn Klieb, limits of Rabat. After their development proposal failed because the Authority found no pre-1978 residential use, the applicants sought a civil-court declaration that the premises had in fact been so used — a finding meaningful only inside the planning code. The Court identified the litigation’s real aim: “sabiex jużaw dawn il-proċeduri… li jiżviluppaw il-post tagħhom” [to use these proceedings in aid of their wish to develop their property].
It rejected the collateral route with a warning against end-runs around the statutory scheme: “minflok jgħaddu mill-bieb jgħaddu mit-tieqa” [instead of going through the door, they try the window].
The holding is categorical: “ilment relatat ma’ permessi ta’ żvilupp ma jistax jitressaq quddiem il-Prim’Awla tal-Qorti Ċivili… iżda quddiem it-Tribunal… bid-dritt ta’ appell quddiem il-Qorti tal-Appell.” [a grievance relating to development permits cannot be brought before the First Hall of the Civil Court but before the Tribunal, with a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal].
Doctrinally, the Court draws a bright line between forum and relief: “hemm, u trid tinżamm, distinzjoni ċara bejn il-poter ġurisdizzjonali u r-rimedju” [there must be a clear distinction between jurisdictional power and the remedy that may be sought].
Where the controversy is created by — and has legal effect only within — the planning regime, any remedy must be pursued within that regime: “Dawn il-proċeduri saru għalxejn… ir-rimedju kellu jintalab taħt ir-reġim tal-liġi.” [These proceedings were to no avail… the remedy had to be sought under the legal regime that governs these matters].
Properly applied, this preserves institutional competence (facts and merits to expert tribunals), legality (questions of law to the courts), and democratic legitimacy (policy applied by administrators rather than remade in litigation).
