There is a claim in public debate that Bill No. 144 of 2025 “kills” the courts’ power in planning appeals. Yet, I always insisted that such claim is a total untruth in the sense that the Bill clarifies—rather than curtails—the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction)’s supervisory function over the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal.
Indeed, Bill 144 — Clause 46(1) provides as follows:
‘(a) The Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) shall have the power to confirm or annul the decision of the Tribunal.
(b) Where the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) annuls the Tribunal’s decision, it shall refer back the acts of the proceedings to the Tribunal for a fresh decision, in accordance with the legal parameters established by the Court’.
The recent Court of Appeal decision of 15 October 2025 in Moviment Graffitti et vs Planning Authority et (App. 7/2025)— the Townsquare judgment—illustrates the point with precision. The Court accepted legal grounds concerning (i) the permissibility of Class 4D catering uses relative to residential and Primary Town Centre designations, (ii) the proper reading of FAR Policy §7.11 on minimum apartment sizes in tall buildings, and (iii) whether the public open space required by the FAR Policy must be consolidated rather than fragmented; it rejected grounds tied to technical/factual appreciation (e.g., the roof-deck pool’s impacts) and affirmed the lawfulness of using reserved matters under L.S. 552.13, reg. 9. Ultimately, it revoked the Tribunal’s decision and remitted the acts “…sabiex jirregola ruħu fit-termini ta’ din is-sentenza.”
In this blog, it is not my intention to comment on the underlying planning merits, nor on whether one agrees with the Court’s evaluative conclusions—though, naturally, I have my academic views on the exact law/fact boundary.
What matters for present purposes is this: the Townsquare judgment confirms that courts correct errors of law and set the legal parameters; the Tribunal re-decides the planning merits accordingly. That is exactly the confirm/annul-and-remit model in Bill 144, and the judgment gives it clear credence. Those who criticised the Bill on the ground that it diminishes judicial power should, in light of this judgment, recognise that it accurately states the law’s proper division of labour.
