Co-ownership disputes often become difficult not because the law is unclear, but because parties treat a statutory route as if it were a broad discretion. Article 495A of the Civil Code (Chapter 16 of the Laws of Malta) is not an equitable shortcut. It is a tightly framed mechanism: it contains a jurisdictional gateway, it measures majority support in a particular way, it imposes a strict safeguard for dissenters, and it demands a defined procedure. If any part is mishandled, the case may fail on law and procedure rather than on the commercial merits.

The first point to watch is whether Article 495A is available at all. The remedy is not open in every form of shared ownership. The statute itself begins by excluding cases of condominium and forced indivision, and it permits the mechanism only where three further conditions exist: (i) the property has been held in common for more than three years; (ii) no co-owner has already filed an action before another court or tribunal for the partition of the property held in common, and (iii) the co-owners have failed to reach agreement among themselves on the sale of the particular property. These are not “background considerations”, they are the legal pre-conditions for the Court’s power to act. This is all contained in Article 495A(1) Civil Code.

A recurring source of error at this stage is the assumption that persistent disagreement is enough. It is not. Another is the attempt to use Article 495A as a way to circumvent a partition route or to “race” pending proceedings. The statute makes it clear that Article 495A is conditioned by the absence of a pending partition action. If partition litigation has already been commenced, the Article 495A route is exposed at the level of jurisdiction.

The second point to watch is how the statute defines majority will. Article 495A does not measure the majority by headcount alone. It requires the Court, if it authorises the sale, to do so in line with what is desired by the “greater number” of co-owners measured by the value of their shares. In other words, the legal majority is a function of share value, not simply of the number of persons supporting the sale. This again is expressly embedded in Article 495A(1) Civil Code. Practically, this means that an application that does not present a coherent and evidenced picture of the number and value of shares is structurally weak: it is not merely an evidential defect – it goes to whether the statutory majority criterion is satisfied.

The third point, and the one which should dominate the legal analysis, is the minority safeguard. Article 495A is not “majority wins” without restraint. Even if the gateway conditions are met and even if the majority by share value supports the sale, the Court cannot lawfully authorise the sale unless it is satisfied that none of the dissenting co-owners would be gravely prejudiced by the order. This is not a discretionary courtesy –  it is a statutory condition. The provision is explicit that authorisation depends on the Court being satisfied that the outcome will not gravely prejudice dissenters. This safeguard is also in Article 495A(1) Civil Code.

This is where matters often go sour in practice. Applicants sometimes treat “grave prejudice” as an afterthought, assuming that establishing deadlock and majority support will automatically carry the day. That approach is legally unsafe, because the statute makes minority protection a condition of jurisdictional authorisation. Conversely, dissenters sometimes present any disadvantage as a veto. That too is legally unsafe because the statute does not speak of prejudice in general – it speaks of grave prejudice. The legal task is therefore not to show that a dissenter dislikes the outcome, but to address—by evidence—the seriousness threshold built into the statute.

The fourth point to watch is that Article 495A is heavily procedural, and procedure is where applications most often fail. The law requires the request to be made by a judicial application (rikors) and it specifies what must accompany it. In particular, the application must have annexed to it: (i) a declaration by the co-owners who agree to the sale; (ii) a schedule setting out the number and value of the shares held by each of those co-owners; and (iii) the terms and conditions under which the sale will take place. The application must also state the date when the property came to be held in common and the relevant circumstances. All of this is required by Article 495A(2) Civil Code.

Two things follow from this. First, Article 495A is not satisfied by a general assertion of entitlement or by informal understandings: the statute demands a structured documentary presentation. Second, the annexes are not optional but they form part of the statutory form of the remedy. An application that is missing these building blocks risks failing for non-compliance with the statutory scheme.

The statute then imposes mandatory steps designed to protect absent or dissenting co-owners. It requires that the application be formally notified to all co-owners who do not agree with the sale. It also requires notification to curators appointed by the Court to represent any co-owner who is unknown or cannot be found. In addition, the law requires the Registrar to ensure that a copy of the application is published both in the Government Gazette and in one daily newspaper. These are not matters of tactical choice –  they are statutory safeguards, laid down in Article 495A(3) Civil Code.

Where a co-owner is stated to be unknown or untraceable, the statute adds a further safeguard: that declaration must be confirmed on oath by one of the applicants. This is required by Article 495A(4) Civil Code. The practical point is obvious but often overlooked: it is not enough to “say” a person cannot be found. The statute insists on sworn verification, precisely because the consequences of the order are serious and potentially irreversible.

These procedural requirements explain why Article 495A cases can unexpectedly become costly and slow. The mechanism binds persons who may not be present in court. That is why the law insists on formal notification, curatorship where needed, publication, and sworn confirmation. A party who treats these requirements as capable of “substantial compliance” is taking a legal risk. Maltese procedural law is commonly treated as having a public-order character, meaning that serious defects can be taken even if not pleaded by the opposing party. The safer assumption is that, in a statutory compulsory sale scheme, the Court will insist on strict observance of the steps the legislature has imposed.

In summary, the practical legal warnings are straightforward. First, confirm at the start that Article 495A is legally available: it is excluded in certain forms of holding, it requires more than three years of common ownership, and it presupposes the absence of pending partition proceedings. Second, treat majority as the statute treats it: it is measured by the value of shares, and must be evidenced in a structured way. Third, treat “grave prejudice” as a central statutory safeguard, not as a rhetorical point. Fourth, treat procedure as binding: the correct annexes, the correct notifications, curatorship where needed, Gazette and newspaper publication, and sworn confirmation for unknown or missing co-owners. Most failures in this area are not caused by complex doctrine; they are caused by avoidable statutory non-compliance with a mechanism that the legislature has intentionally made strict.