The President of Malta occupies a unique position within the constitutional framework of the country. The prerogatives vested in the office grant the President a limited but significant capacity to act in extraordinary circumstances. There exist specific prerogatives that empower the President to act independently in constitutional crises. Specifically, Article 80 of the Constitution of Malta states: ‘Wherever there shall be occasion for the appointment of a Prime Minister, the President shall appoint as Prime Minister the member of the House of Representatives who, in his judgment, is best able to command the support of a majority of the members of that House and shall, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, appoint the other Ministers from among the members of the House of Representatives: Provided that if occasion arises for making an appointment to the office of Prime Minister or any other Minister while Parliament is dissolved, a person who was a member of the House of Representatives immediately before the dissolution may be appointed as Prime Minister or any other Minister as if, in each case, such person were still a member of the House of Representatives, but any person so appointed shall vacate office at the beginning of the next session of Parliament if he is not then a member thereof’. This empowers the President to remove a Prime Minister who has lost parliamentary confidence and refuses to resign or request a dissolution.
Similarly, Article 76(5) provides: ‘In the exercise of his powers under this article the President shall act in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister: Provided that – (a) if the House of Representatives passes a resolution, supported by the votes of a majority of all the members thereof, that it has no confidence in the Government, and the Prime Minister does not within three days either resign from his office or advise a dissolution, the President may dissolve Parliament; (b) if the office of Prime Minister is vacant and the President considers that there is no prospect of his being able within a reasonable time to appoint to that office a person who can command the support of a majority of the members of the House of Representatives, the President may dissolve Parliament; and (c) if the Prime Minister recommends a dissolution and the President considers that the Government of Malta can be carried on without a dissolution and that a dissolution would not be in the interests of Malta, the President may refuse to dissolve Parliament’. This ensures that the President can call elections in cases of governmental deadlock.
Additionally, Article 76(2) states: ‘Subject to the provisions of sub-article (3) of this article, Parliament, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for five years from the date of its first sitting after any dissolution and shall then stand dissolved’. This enables the President to prevent premature elections when an alternative parliamentary majority is available.
Despite these prerogatives, the President does not wield an active role in political or legal decision-making. Unlike in executive presidencies, where heads of state may exercise broader discretion, Malta’s constitutional framework envisions a President whose primary function is to uphold the rule of law rather than dictate policy. One contentious question concerns the President’s power to refuse assent to legislation. Article 72(2) of the Constitution explicitly states: ‘When a bill is presented to the President for assent, he shall without delay signify that he assents’. This provision eliminates any potential veto power. While the President can raise concerns over legislation, he is ultimately bound to act in accordance with parliamentary decisions.
The ruth of the matter is, therefore, that under normal circumstances, the President’s functions are largely symbolic, requiring the head of state to act on the advice of the Prime Minister and the government. This means that while the President plays a limited role in constitutional oversight, the true guardian of the Maltese Constitution remains the Constitutional Court – an independent judicial authority which may review laws, executive decisions, and judicial actions to ensure compliance with constitutional norms.
Indeed, over the past three decades, the Constitutional Court has struck down executive actions that violate constitutional rights under Article 46(1): ‘Subject to the provisions of sub-articles (6) and (7) of this article, any person who alleges that any of the provisions of articles 33 to 45 (inclusive) of this Constitution has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him, or such other person as the Civil Court, First Hall, in Malta may appoint at the instance of any person who so alleges, may, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter that is lawfully available, apply to the Civil Court, First Hall, for redress.’
The Constitutional Court is also empowered to award moral or non-pecuniary damages in human rights cases, as recognized under Article 46(2): ‘The Civil Court, First Hall, shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made by any person in pursuance of sub-article (1) of this article, and may make such orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing, or securing the enforcement of, any of the provisions of the said articles 33 to 45(inclusive) to the protection of which the person concerned is entitled: Provided that the Court may, if it considers it desirable so to do, decline to exercise its powers under this sub-article in any case where it is satisfied that adequate means of redress for the contravention alleged are or have been available to the person concerned under any other law.’
Even more so, the Constitutional Court exercises broad remedial powers, including declaring laws null and void due to constitutional incompatibility under Article 116, which states: ‘A right of action for a declaration that any law is invalid on any grounds other than inconsistency with the provisions of articles33 to 45 of this Constitution shall appertain to all persons without distinction and a person bringing such an action shall not be required to show any personal interest in support of his action.’
The Constitutional Court has also intervened in electoral matters, awarding additional parliamentary seats to the Opposition following an error in vote counting—despite no statutory provision for such a remedy.
Indeed, the President of Malta holds certain prerogatives that may be exercised in extraordinary circumstances, and that much cannot be denied. Yet, these powers are tightly constrained within the constitutional order. In essence, the President serves as a stabilizing figure rather than an active political agent. Meanwhile, the true function of constitutional oversight remains with the Constitutional Court.
